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Conducting research in an emergency
situation, such as an outbreak of disease,
poses ethical challenges. These challenges
differ according to the type of research:
epidemiologic or clinical, and for the
latter, whether the disease outbreak can
be anticipated in advance. We address
these three situations, proposing different
potential solutions for each.
In an outbreak situation, public health
authorities undertake a rapid response in
an effort to document the existence and
magnitude of a public health problem in
the community and to implement appro-
priate measures to address the problem
[1]. This rapid response will in some cases
preclude the possibility of clearance by a
research ethics committee since the time
required to develop and submit a detailed
research protocol and respond to any
requested modifications by the committee,
followed by re-review, would thwart the
very purpose of the response. According to
one prominent view, to require a full
written protocol and submission to an
ethics review board would not be in the
interests of the individuals or the commu-
nity because the resulting delays would
frequently cause excess disease and death
[2]. These authors suggest, however, that
emergency response consent forms could
be developed and used in these situations.
Other individuals engaged in public health
practice have voiced concern that subject-
ing their work to the routinely required
‘‘regulatory constraints imposed on re-
search’’ would prevent flexible and timely
approaches to situations such as disease
outbreaks [3]. They argue that timeliness
is a major requirement that would have to
be counterbalanced with other ethical
concerns. An example is that of pandemic
influenza outbreaks, in which it is alleged
that the review process would impair the
ability of public health agencies to react in
a timely manner.
For researchers and public health agen-
cies, therefore, the question is how to
comply with the ethical requirement that
research be approved by a properly
constituted, independent ethical review
committee (ERC) but still enable a prompt
response when an outbreak occurs. If we
concede that existing methods of ethical
review are too protracted to be useful in
outbreak situations, can alternative mech-
anisms be employed to ensure that such
investigations undergo some type of ethical
review? How can the rights and welfare of
individuals be protected during investiga-
tions of disease outbreaks, and at the same
time enable such investigations to be
carried out expeditiously?
In addition to review by a research
ethics committee, a fundamental ethical
requirement in research is to obtain
informed consent from participants. Al-
though not all research requires the
informed consent of individual subjects,
the vast majority of clinical research, most
social and behavioral research, and some
epidemiologic research must be carried
out with the voluntary, informed consent
of participants or their legally authorized
representatives. In contrast, in many
instances of public health practice, collec-
tion and use of information or human
biological specimens can be conducted
without a written informed consent docu-
ment and without obtaining permission to
store the samples for future use. However,
a problem could arise if an investigator
wants to use these samples, collected
initially for public health purposes, for
research. Current research practice calls
for obtaining consent for the use of
specimens in future research that may
not be known at the time they are
collected. Samples obtained in a non-
research context without such provisions
may require going back to get consent
from sampled individuals, which could be
logistically difficult, if not impossible. For
example, samples with no identifying
information could not be traced back to
the individuals from whom they were
obtained. Additionally, if a considerable
time has elapsed between the collection of
identifiable samples and the plan to use
them in research, it could be difficult to
locate the individuals. If researchers intend
to use previously collected samples without
going back to get consent, they must
provide a justification in the protocol
submitted to the research ethics commit-
tee.
It is hard to see, even in non-research
contexts, how human biological specimens
could be obtained or even how individuals
could be surveyed without first obtaining
their permission to draw blood or to ask
questions that may intrude on their
privacy. Nevertheless, procedures for ob-
taining consent from individuals in an
outbreak situation could depart from those
typically used in other investigations and
still be ethically acceptable. It is surely not
necessary to include all 26 items listed as
‘‘essential information for prospective re-
search subjects’’ in the CIOMS Internation-
al Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
[4]. It is important, however, for investi-
gators to ensure that individuals under-
stand that what they are consenting to is
research, and not routine activities carried
out by public health practitioners during a
disease outbreak. Nevertheless, ensuring a
participant’s understanding of the differ-
ence between public health practice and
research may be complicated by the
emotional distress that potential partici-
pants can experience during an outbreak
situation. Although appropriate steps are
needed when participants become vulner-
able in such situations, that would not
change the level of risk from minimal to
more than minimal risk. The level of risk is
determined by the procedures in the
research proposal and not by the charac-
teristics of the population. When popula-
tions are vulnerable for whatever reason,
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requires establishing safeguards or added
protections. Such safeguards can range
from specifying exclusion criteria for
potential subjects in great distress to taking
steps to work sensitively to protect the
rights and interests of marginalized popu-
lations. An institutional review board
(IRB) chair or designated reviewer can
always request additional reviewers to
ensure that vulnerable individuals are
adequately protected.
The US Food and Drug
Administration ‘‘Emergency’’
Rules
It might be thought that the problems
related to obtaining consent from people
in an outbreak situation could be over-
come by an appeal to the clause in the US
Code of Federal Regulations that permits
a waiver of informed consent for research
conducted in an emergency, the so-called
final rules [5]. However, the rule is
inapplicable to the situation under discus-
sion here. The rule is intended to apply to
clinical situations, such as major trauma,
cardiac arrest, or other incapacitating
circumstances, in which prospective re-
search participants are unable to grant
consent. Under the rules, the situation
must be life-threatening, requiring an
immediate intervention, and there must
be no standard treatment that could be
used instead of an experimental interven-
tion. Consent may be waived only when
next of kin or a guardian is not present or
cannot be reached in sufficient time before
initiating the research. It is clear then, that
the exception from informed consent
requirements applies only to research in
which individual patients in life-threaten-
ing situations must receive immediate
treatment, and not the type of research
conducted in an emergency response to an
outbreak of infectious disease.
In addition, nothing in the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) final rules
exempts the research from review by an
IRB or ERC. On the contrary, the IRB
review and logistical requirements needed
for approval of studies under the final rules
have been described as so burdensome
that they may be impeding much needed
resuscitation research [6,7]. One reason
studies that fall under the umbrella of the
final rules are not exempt from IRB review
is that they involve a foreseen and
common emergency situation where there
is ample time to prepare a full research
protocol and have it approved by a
committee. Potential participants in
these studies are unfortunate but not
unexpected members of communities
where the disease or occurrence in ques-
tion (e.g., major trauma, cardiac arrest)
takes place at some known frequency.
Another requirement in the FDA rules
is community consultation before the
research can be initiated. A plan for such
consultation must be included in the
protocol submitted to the IRB. Clearly,
in the case of most outbreaks, affected
communities probably cannot be identi-
fied in advance, precluding the very
possibility of conducting such research.
For all these reasons, the FDA emergency
rules are inapplicable to research conduct-
ed in disease outbreaks.
Possible Solutions
What solutions are available to ensure
that public health research in disease
outbreaks can proceed without undue
delays and yet protect the rights and
welfare of human beings who are sur-
veyed, whose blood is drawn, or who
receive experimental or off-label drugs? It
might be argued that approval of a
proposed investigation by a Ministry of
Health can serve this purpose. However,
approval by a Ministry of Health is not the
equivalent of ethical review and clearance
by a duly constituted committee. Both
types of approval are necessary in research
in non-emergency situations, but a gov-
ernmental office is not equipped to do the
same sort of review as a committee with
expertise and experience in research
ethics.
An appropriate solution would be to
seek an alternative mechanism to that of
full review of a complete research protocol
by an IRB or ERC. Different strategies
would be appropriate for epidemiologic
research, on the one hand, and clinical
trials, on the other.
Epidemiologic Research
The methodology used in epidemiology
can be the same whether an activity is
characterized as research or public health
practice. In regard to research, a well-
established procedure for ethics review
already exists that would apply to almost
all epidemiologic research conducted in a
disease outbreak. That mechanism is
expedited review by an ERC. Such
investigations pose no more than minimal
risk, as the most invasive procedures
involving human beings are likely to be
blood drawing and survey completion.
Expedited review is typically conducted
by committee chairs or someone they
designate, and can be accomplished within
a day or two. Committees could establish a
policy for disease outbreak investigations
in which a full, detailed protocol need not
be submitted. A shorter document de-
scribing the background, the purpose of
the research, informed consent proce-
dures, and steps to protect the confiden-
tiality of information obtained from the
individuals should be acceptable in such a
policy. As for the need to obtain informed
consent from participants, in epidemiolog-
ic research, the requirements for informed
consent typically are guided by whether
identifiable information is collected and
how it is collected. A duly constituted
oversight body could decide to waive the
requirement for signed consent forms in
favor of oral consent depending on the
specifics of a research proposal.
Clinical Research
Research involving experimental medi-
cations or new uses for approved drugs is
considered more than minimal risk, and
therefore cannot be reviewed by the
expedited mechanism. Two situations call
for somewhat different solutions. The first
situation is that of repeat occurrences of an
outbreak of a known disease, such as
cholera [8,9,10]. Although the exact time
when an outbreak will occur may not be
known, it is well established in certain
areas that future outbreaks are highly
likely. An example is Tanzania, where
cholera outbreaks have occurred regularly
since the epidemic was first identified in
1978 [11]. In this situation, investigators
can prepare what we shall call a ‘‘model
protocol,’’ with all the basic elements
spelled out in detail. The model protocol
can be submitted for full review to the IRB
or ERC, omitting items that are specific to
the time and place of the predicted
outbreak. When the outbreak occurs,
investigators can complete the specific
information for review by the committee.
Although those specific details could be
reviewed in an expedited manner, a
problem could arise where the drugs to
be studied are not known in advance.
Some drugs have higher risk profiles than
others, so studies involving such drugs
would probably require full committee
review.
The second situation, somewhat more
problematic, is an outbreak of a disease
heretofore unknown. Probably the best
recent example is that of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) [12]. The
novelty of SARS, and the fact that the
epidemic was both rapid in its onset and
short in its duration, made it difficult to
study. Despite the global impact of SARS,
relatively few treatment protocols were
studied in clinical trials [13,14,15,16]. One
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SARS was even terminated prematurely
because the epidemic had subsided just as
the study got underway [14].
The SARS epidemic highlights the
major difficulties in conducting clinical
research in disease outbreaks involving
novel disease-causing agents. Unlike a
disease like cholera, where an outbreak
and a population can be predicted with
some certainty, SARS occurred in a
population that was impossible to pre-
identify. Furthermore, the causative agent
of SARS was initially unknown, and no
existing approved treatment protocols
were in place. Despite the logistical and
methodological difficulty of conducting
clinical trials in outbreaks of new diseases,
it is precisely these situations where clinical
studies are most needed. Unfortunately,
the use of ‘‘model protocols’’ to enable the
more rapid IRB or ERC review described
above may not be sufficient for outbreaks
of new diseases. However, in the case of
pandemic influenza, a model protocol
could still be developed even though the
particular strain of the virus may not be
known in advance. Existing antiviral
medications could be used in initial studies
until new preventive vaccines or therapeu-
tic medications can be manufactured and
used in subsequent clinical trials.
The most urgent concern at the time of
an outbreak of any disease is to implement
public health measures to contain its
spread. What those measures should be,
and to what extent they may involve
limitations on individual liberty and other
socialdistancingmechanisms,posedifferent
ethical challenges. We have described a
mechanism whereby epidemiologic re-
search can commence immediately, under
the conditions of expedited review outlined
above. In the meantime, investigators will
have to develop clinical research protocols
toaddressapreviouslyunknowndiseaseand
seek IRB approval in the usual manner or
through the use of ‘‘model protocols.’’
Conclusion
Some form of ethical oversight is
needed to conduct an investigation of a
disease outbreak, be it predictable or
unanticipated. The mechanism and pro-
cedures can vary from that of an estab-
lished ERC, acting in an expedited
manner for minimal risk research, to
development of a model protocol submit-
ted to a committee for full review in
advance of an anticipated future outbreak.
Such safeguards can help to ensure that
the rights and welfare of individuals are
protected in disease outbreaks and that
communities maintain trust in public
health research and practice.
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